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Introduction
Oliver Schroeder, It.
HE ISSUE OF de facto segregation ignites divergent constitu-
tional philosophies. The contributors to the law phase of
this Symposium have delineated their respective legal beliefs in
cogent articles. Mr. Bloch emphasizes the law as an element for
stability through which man's progress develops in measured beat
under traditional legal procedures. He contends that the other
elements of life identified as psychology, sociology, or anthropology
must be accepted by law only
after the human community
THE AUTHOR (A.B., Western Reserve has, reasoned, through experi-
University, LL.B., Harvard Law School)
is Professor of Constitutional Law and ence, that law must change.
Acting Dean for Administrative Affairs Mr. Carter, on the other hand,
at Western Reserve University School of law with
Law. invigorates la ihpositive
responsibilities to correct social
ills. These corrections are not
only identified by the disciplines of psychology, sociology, and
anthropology, but must be applied to the community by the law
as it fixes social policy. In this process human reason seeks to
force social experience in order to advance the commonweal.
Roscoe Pound constantly underscores this continuous ebb and
flow in law: reason tempered by experience and experience sub-
jected to reason. Mr. Bloch represents forcibly the philosophy
which primarily rests on the need for experience. Segregation in
fact will be dissipated through human contacts in a multitude of
private contacts. People will then be ready for new rules of law
to undergird a new community of men free from racial inequality.
Mr. Carter, however, underscores vigorously the philosophy which
rests primarily on human reason: segregation by rule or custom
must be eliminated. Law must sanction this elimination by forcing
a community into the new experience of desegregating or even
integrating education as a matter of fact.
The reader is further aided in selecting his personal conviction
in this affair by the legal scholarship of a third contributor -
Judge J. Skelly Wright, a distinguished federal jurist. His inspira-
tional writing discloses the imminent need for a man to mold a just
society, whether it be by reason, experience, or a combination of
both. And whatever course is taken, any lack of legal unity and
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clarity must not be a source of discouragement. The common law
system of justice has been ill-equipped to handle the racial con-
frontation in our country. To understand why this is so will aid our
personal deliberations on this most complex of human problems.
Basically, the reason for today's legal turbulence over racial
segregation, desegregation, and integration arises from the slavery
system in Anglo-American history. When slaves were introduced
to the legal system in America in 1619, no place existed to receive
this new type of human relationship. In the homeland of the
common law, the Englishman had divested himself of slave and
serf relationships centuries before. Even when serfdom or slavery
existed, the persons involved had legal rights as human beings
recognized by law. When the African slave was introduced to the
common law society, no human personality with legal rights was
recognized. To solve legal complications which arose, the law
grasped for applicable rules. These rules were found in the law
of chattels; the slave came to be considered exclusively a chattel
and in this way the legal problems which arose were easily solved.
How different were the legal experiences with a slave system
in other segments of the Western world. The Roman Empire
recognized slavery; yet the slave was a human personality. He
owed his labor in bondage to his master; but he had legal rights.
He could marry and have a family. He was free to travel about within
certain geographic areas, much larger areas in size than the slave
in Southern United States. He could often buy his freedom, and
he was recognized as an entity for legal process as party or witness.
Much the same story could be told for the Spanish slavery system
in the colonies of Latin America. Here even the Roman Catholic
Church had a place for the spiritual personality of the slave. The
priest could sanction the master for ill-treatment of the slave who
was after all a fellow-Christian. The Spanish legal system was
keyed to a slavery legality in the Sixteenth Century in Latin
America, because the homeland itself was still experiencing a slavery
system with the Moors as late as the Fourteenth and Fifteenth Cen-
turies.
In the Seventeenth Century, the Anglo-American common law
lost touch with a slave system incorporating viable legal rights for
the slave as a human personality. No other slave system in human
history so completely dehumanized a man under the rule of law.
The African slave in Southern United States had no spiritual
personality. He was not a fellow-Christian and had no legal per-
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sonality. And what is most devastating, he could not even acquire
such status when granted his freedom, for the United States Con-
stitution prohibited it. So said the United States Supreme Court
in the Dred Scott case. Today's cattle prod used so unwisely by
some officers of the law is a stark reminder that the slave was not
a man with legal rights and duties; rather he was a chattel without
legal recognition as a person - property like cattle.
The fourteenth amendment completely reversed our legal con-
cept of the Negro slave; not because it imposed duties on the states
to provide due process of law and equal protection of the law, nor
because it granted legislative authority to Congress to effect these
great concepts. The real power in the fourteenth amendment lies
in bestowing citizenship on the slave. The elimination of slavery
by the thirteenth amendment is secondary. A free man without
citizenship remains legally inferior, but with citizenship he becomes
a complete human personality.
A century ago American law truly reversed legal history. Re-
gretfully, the common law system in America failed the Negro
even as a slave. We must be sure it does not fail him as a citizen.
How to achieve this goal has been suggested in this Symposium by
two able lawyers and a respected judge. Their legal beliefs differ
widely, but their scholarly analysis can serve each reader well as
individual beliefs are worked out for man's most challenging issues
of racial understanding and equality.
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